Talking our Extinction to Death: Nuclear Discourse and the News Media by Allan, Stuart
TALKING OUR EXTINCTION TO DEATH: NUCLEAR 
DISCOURSE AND THE NEWS MEDIA 
Stuart AUan 
Carleton University 
A partir d'une appmhe linguistique critique, l'auteur entreprend une revue 
de tout ce qui appartient h la notion de "nukespeak" dam la litt6rature de 
langue anglaise. Son article 6voque l'irnportance de formuler un nouvel objet 
d'analyse: la reproduction sociale du discours sur le nuclbaire lorsqu'il foule 
le champ stratkgique de l'information mhtique. 
Nuclear weaponry depends, more than any weaponry in the past, it seems, 
upon structures of information and communication, structures of language, 
including non-vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic 
decoding. But the phenomenon is fabulously textural also to the extent that 
for the moment, a nuclear war has not taken place: one can only talk and 
write about it.. The temfying reality of the nuclear conflict can only be the 
signified referent, never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or a 
text At least today apparently @em& 1984: 23). 
Is the 'reality' of nuclear war a reality contained within language? Certainly in light 
of the post-structuralist critique of Western forms of epistemology, particularly its 
attendant emphasis on the inscription of the individual in a complex matrix of symbolic 
practices, it appears reasonable to assume that the 'nuclear phenomenon' is indeed the 
culmination of multiple issue fields produced in discourse. Such a presupposition will, 
of course, spark considerable consternation on the part of those researchers posited 
within a traditional Durkheimian, positivistic approach to social reality, one where that 
reality is assumed to be an empirical 'fact' external to the (essential) individual. 
However, while acknowledging that the very effectivity of social relations then 
surfaces as a point of debate, the question of determination will here be posed strictly 
in terms of the language-reality relation. After all, if to isolate a single element of 
nuclear discourse and attribute to it the capacity to arbitrarily define reality is 
somewhat fanciful (as could be incorrectly inferred from Demda's statement above), 
so too is a view of social meaning as the stable, invariant property of a discursive 
product. Therefore, in advancing an effort to elucidate the means by which nuclear 
discourse is actualized within news text, it is this notion of effectivity which must be 
privileged theoretically. 
As a concrete manifestation of specific ways of knowing, nuclear discourse con- 
tains fragmentary traces of other, often contradictory, discourses (those of Nation, 
Sovereignty, Duty, Geo-politics, Economics, Defence, Deterrence, Peace, and 
Security are common). Accordingly, in endeavoring to secure the discursive terrain 
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of the 'nuclear phenomenon' as an object for analysis, it is crucial that the symbolic 
scheme through which it is organized be distinguished from the dominant structure of 
institutional relations. Hence the particular attractiveness of ment research ac- 
complished under the general rubric of discourse analysis, with its radical reformula- 
tion of the news media as a field upon which struggles over signification transpire. 
One where competing (non-exclusive) meaning systems are inflected so as to inter- 
pellate the addressed individual (through active practice) as concrete subject (see 
Pecheux, 1982). Having first accounted for the specificity of the news media's loca- 
tion within capitalist social relations, their role in the mobilization of discursive for- 
mations as 'newsworthy' (a status demarcated by an expressive unity achieved through 
various narrative devices), and the consequent hierarchical ordering of voices within 
the produced text, emerge as key focal points for critique. Furthermore, the occupa- 
tional strategies, professional ideologies, and typification schemes employed by 
newsworkers during the selection, construction and presentation of news events may 
then be set in relation to those claims to facticity immanent at the level of textual dis- 
course. In this way, the (legitimated) social structures that they are working to 
reproduce will also be accentuated (see Comer, 1983; Lerman, 1983; van Dijk, 1985). 
This paper proposes to begin the task of identifying a new topic of inquiry for 
mass communication research through initiating a call for sustained analytical treat- 
ment of nuclear discourse as it is embedded in those systems of knowing routinely 
processed by the news media. No attempt will be undertaken here to advance poten- 
tial strategies for the further refinement of discourse analysis of this type (see instead 
Allan, 1987; Allan in Hackett, forthcoming). Rather, this paper is offered as a critical 
review of the English-language literature pertaining to the notions of 'nukespeak' and 
the 'nuclearization of language', much of which is located within the domain of criti- 
cal linguistics. In outlining the general contours of the proposed conceptual 
framework, this paper will fmt draw upon George Orwell's novel 1984 and the lin- 
guistic program of Newspeak detailed there, before proceeding to research conducted 
on the nukespeak problematic itself. It should be noted that the respective studies have 
been categorized into different sections for purposes of thematic, and not necessarily 
methodological coherence. Each will be assessed here in terms of its potential useful- 
ness for generating insights into the social configuration of nuclear discourse as it 
traverses the strategic field of the news media. This paper will conclude with sugges- 
tions regarding the direction of future investigations. 
Rethinking News As Discourse 
A view to outlining a new conceptual basis for the situation of the social (re)production 
of public discourse within the complex system of the mass media as an institutional 
apparatus has only recently been recognized by some media theorists as a necessary 
prerequisite for the continued advancement of more sophisticated notions of meaning 
construction; hence a new focus on the work of certain linguists concerned with the 
language of the media (see Davis and Walton, 1983; Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew, 
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1979). In the course of the past three decades, theoretical perspectives such as 
symbolic-interactionism, phenomenology and ethnomethodology have sparked a 
considerable upheaval within the field of linguistics (generally defined). 
Consequently, a number of divergent approaches have emerged, some of which are in 
direct opposition to what many recognize to be the dominant framework for the 
analysis of language practice, namely that provided by studies of transformational 
generative grammar. Of interest here is critical linguistics, an approach which set 
about attempting to demonsttate that language is an integral part of the social process 
(thus the 'language' and 'society' division indicative of sociolinguistics collapses) and, 
as such, is implicated in the prevailing forms of economic and social organization (see 
Fowler and Kress, 1979). If the precise institutional and organizational conditions and 
practices of linguistic production have been left relatively undertheorized (often 
simply asserted within a text-context dynamic), critical linguistics has proven capable 
of providing the necessary tools to explore how discursive practices are themselves 
the site of linguistic conflict where particular 'realities' are systematically 'filtered 
out'. Through accentuating the productive dimension of discourse, the integration of 
the text with the social context of its articulation is then confirmed (the effect is itself 
anchored in a certain modality of power) and thus, in this way, new understandings of 
how prevailing modes of social control are systematically ex-nominated (Barthes, 
1973) may be realized. As will be discussed below, this is achieved primarily through 
explicating a discourse's conditions of existence in addition to the internal form of its 
signification. 
In thinking of news as discourse, certain key assumptions usually associated with 
conventional research on the production of news accounts are problematized. For ex- 
ample, in the past studies have often revolved around the notion of partisan 'bias', 
thereby suggesting that the political or ideological role of the news media could be 
reduced largely to questions of 'balance', 'impartiality', or 'objectivity' (see Hackett, 
1984, for a critique of this paradigm). It was only in the course of engaging in an in- 
tensive theoretical reworking of several of the central organizing concepts of text- 
centred research that some practitioners of critical linguistics adopted an alternative 
strategy to recentre the field around the term discourse (often redefined, after Foucault, 
1977, as language grasped as utterance; that is, as systematically organized modes of 
speaking) and the political, economic, and ideological processes which mediate rela- 
tions of control (see Connell and Miles, 1985; Hall, 1986, 1982; Morley, 1983). In 
treating news as discourse, the consideration of the prohibitions surrounding speech 
could also be allowed for as they, in a given conjuncture, partially demarcate 'what 
can and should be said' pecheux, 1982). Moreover, in distinguishing analytically 
news discourse from the constraints and definitions which constitute the media or- 
ganization itself (that is, as specific signifying practices), the means by which news 
texts accomplish certain 'meaning effects' for the audience could then be better 
theorized. 
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This last point indicates for analysis that news be recognized as a system or series 
of systems of meaning; that within news discourse, constructions of the audience are 
inscribed; and, finally, that the interconnections between knowledge and power be 
identified in relation to the means by which that audience is constituted as a social ob- 
ject in the actual news account itself. While recent appropriations of discourse theory 
are indeed beginning to demonstrate the extent to which social knowledge is arranged 
within preferred meanings and interpretations, attempts to illustrate this process 
diachronically remain scarce (see van Dijk, 1985). As will be outlined below, many 
of the studies concerned with nuclear discourse provide new directions for work of 
this nature. Prior to undertaking a critique of that material, however, it is first neces- 
sary to commence with a discussion of George Orwell's novel 1984. As acknowledged 
by a number of inquiries into the political structuring of the nuclear issue field by the 
mass media, his notion of 'Newspeak' is a crucial launching point for a reconsidera- 
tion of the interrelationships between nuclear politics and discourse (see Beedham, 
1983; Chilton, 1983; Fowler and Marshall, 1985; Hodge, 1985a; Hook, 1984a; Knel- 
man, 1985; O'Toole, 1985). 
George Orwell's I984 
Much has been written about Orwell's sagacity as his portrayal of 1984 society has 
proven to be increasingly evocative in the decades following the novel's publication; 
even today the work is considered to be a remarkably catalytic one. While many of 
the themes of which Orwell wrote so eloquently have provided a helpful framework 
to the study of linguistic control of nuclear ideology, it is his startling portrait of the 
means by which a fictitious state is able to maintain and reproduce its hegemony 
through the reification of preferred discursive practices that deserves particular 
attention here. Described in considerable detail are the strategies and techniques 
exploited by Oceania's ruling class to delimit the bounds of possible thought of its 
citizenry, achieved primarily through the inflection of state discourses on public 
knowledge. With this novel, Orwell effectively illustrates a linkage between language 
and the larger patterns of the distribution of power within a class society: a precept 
absent from much of the non-Marxist linguistic analysis of the period. Of prime 
importance for those engaged in research on the powerhanguage paradigm, however, 
is Orwell's notion of 'Newspeak' and the static, closed semantic system it embodies, 
for he argues that it is the underpinning element upon which the central asymmetry of 
power relations within Oceania is configurated. 
As envisioned in the novel, a discursive practice sanctioned by the sate is an ex- 
plicit form of domination, hence the formulation of Newspeak as a mechanism of con- 
trol serving to define an 'official' reality where 'War is Peace', 'Freedom is Slavery', 
and 'Ignorance is Strength'. It is the Oceanic state's insidious plan to narrow the range 
of possible thought (on the part of its population) through the imposition of the 
Newspeak program, the consequences of which are carefully interwoven throughout 
the text. As the 'ultimate political language', Newspeak functions as a restricted code 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, VOL. 14, NO. 1 21 
designed to reinforce and legitimize Oceania's power structure. Practitioners of 
Newspeak accomplish this work in a number of ways, such as through the falsifica- 
tion of those records on which world history is based (so that they correspond to the 
Party's current views). As a popular Oceanic slogan dictates: 'Who controls the 
present controls the past', thus the continuous manipulation of 'factual data' produces 
the effect of 'stopping' history. To the extent that the 'popular memory' relies on such 
documentation, the notion of a common past or heritage ceases to exist. In its place 
is a kind of continuous present in which the Party always acts correctly: "Day by day 
and almost minute by minute, the past was brought up to date ... All history was a 
palimpsest, scraped clean and re-inscribed exactly as often as was necessary" (Orwell, 
1954: 39). 
The replacement of 'Oldspeak' (terms or expressions considered undesirable be- 
cause they possess orthodox or secondary connotations) with Newspeak is also criti- 
cal, as to the extent that oppositional views are dependent on terms such as these ones, 
thinking is made safe for Oceania's ruling class. Furthermore, this literal destruction 
of a counter-vocabulary is complemented by the extensive use of euphemisms in 
'official' discourse. Overt examples include the names given to various state ap- 
paratuses: the 'Ministry of Truth' is responsible for falsehoods, the 'Ministry of 
Plenty' for managing scarcity, the 'Ministry of Peace' for conducting war, the 'Minis- 
try of Love' for torture and terror, and the 'Ministry of Minitrue' for propaganda. In 
establishing Newspeak as the sole medium of expression for the world view and 'men- 
tal habits' proper to the citizenry, the state succeeds in exercising a form of thought 
control which makes speech as nearly as possible independent of consciousness. Fu- 
ture citizens, fully conversant in Newspeak, will be virtually incapable of committing 
most 'crimes' due to an inability to imagine them in the first place. 
While the importance of Onvell's notion of Newspeak for the purposes of this 
paper is evident, it should be acknowledged that serious reservations have been ex- 
pressed regarding the deterministic nature of his views on language (see Chilton, 1984; 
Hodge and Fowler, 1979; and Slater, 1975). Given limitations of space here, perhaps 
one of the more pronounced examples may suffice: namely Onvell's implied thesis 
that language largely determines thought. As he writes, "a Party member called upon 
to make a political or ethical judgement should be able to spray forth the correct 
opinions as automatically as a machine gun spraying forth bullets ... the language gave 
him [sic] an almost foolproof instrument..." (Orwell, 1954: 265). He repeatedly points 
out that it is due to the state's capacity to control a subject's mind through the struc- 
ture of language that it is subsequently able to control the behavior of its citizenry. 
Surely, however, the imposition of certain linguistic devices, in and by itself, would 
prove inadequate as the sole means of reinforcing state hegemony. After all, coercive 
state apparatuses are clearly required to enforce Oceania's reified conceptions of 
reality, thus state practices of censorship, 'disinformation', and 'language reform' are 
made as chillingly effective as they are only through the implicit threat of further coer- 
cive measures by the 'Ministry of Love' and the 'Thought Police'. This latter point, 
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if not acknowledged explicitly by OnveU, does allow him to escape the charge of 
propagating an extreme view of Whodm linguistics. 
The Politics Of Nuclear Language 
Despite the brevity of this overview of Orwell's contribution to the examination of 
certain aspects of the interrelationships between politics and language, it is clear that 
his approach has much to offer the proposed conceptual strategy. While a full 
exposition of potential refinements to his view of the language-reality relation would 
undoubtedly prove to be a worthwhile exercise, here an emphasis shall be placed on 
the problem of 'nuclear reality'; specifically, as it emerges from within the larger 
configurations of power realized in nuclear discourse. In contrast with what may be 
termed 'Onvellian linguistics', discourse analysis privileges the notion that elements 
constitutive of this 'reality' do not contain or possess a single, intrinsic meaning, which 
then determines the order of linguistic units. Rather, the language of nuclear war is to 
be treated as a system formed of linguistic signs, which, conversely, inflects the 
ordering of the social world; meaning thus becomes a productive practice. Such a 
radicalized conception of 'nuclear reality' as discursive system may then provide for 
the effectivity of changes within the social sphere as they transform the fmed 
positionality in which that discourse must sustain itself. Accordingly, it may then be 
'unpacked' in terms of the particular structure it possesses; its subsequent 'meaning' 
being an effect of the various symbolic conventions at work 
Almost at once a new methodology for mass media analyses can be extended to 
consider how certain meanings are being produced at the expense of alternative types. 
Questions may then be advanced regarding the kinds of meaning that are possible if, 
in a systematic fashion, the parameters of socially located meaning systems are or- 
ganized so as to delimit the range of potential meanings to a preferred or dominant 
one. In developing the tools to conceptualize the operation of discursive processes as 
they work to construct order within a social system, discourse analysis, in turn, estab- 
lishes a space for the examination of the dominant representations of nuclear reality. 
That is, it secures for the theorist the means to discover to what extent and by what 
means the social relations of speaking that reality are themselves structured in 
dominance. This is a significant break from earlier efforts which often characterized 
the mass media, after Althusser, strictly as a unified Ideological State Apparatus (ISA); 
one equated with a specific formulation of political power where only the interests of 
a ruling class are represented. Moreover, there existed a marked tendency to invoke 
the ideological reah as a final, all encompassing explanation of the various charac- 
teristics of the media's role and position in the social formation (usually in some form 
of implicit functionalism). This problem remains a serious one for research under- 
taken in media studies to this day, given the degree of difficulty associated with render- 
ing ideology into a practicable concept (see Coward and Ellis, 1977; Hall, 1982; 
Knight, 1982; Thompson, 1984). 
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In tracing further the more pronounced implications of Orwell's Newspeak 
program for recent efforts to theorize nuclear discourse, the most pertinent research 
to be drawn upon revolves around the questions of the 'nuclearization of language' or, 
similarly, 'nukespeak'. A close reading of that (English-language) literature suggests 
that while efforts to provide an analytically precise definition of nukespeak are sig- 
nificant in number (see Aubrey, 1982; Beedham, 1983; Chilton, 1985b, 1982; Faw- 
cett, 1985; Fowler and Marshall, 1985; Hilgartner et a1 1982; Hodge, 1985; Hodge 
and Mansfield, 1985; Hook, 1985,1984a, 1984b; Kress, 1985; Moss, 1985a, 1985b; 
O'Toole, 1985; Van Belle and Claes, 1985), they have consistently proven that the no- 
tion is an elusive one. Generally, most formulations appear to be organized around a 
number of common linguistic elements or themes, the most prominent of which in- 
clude the use of euphemism, jargon, modality, negativity, the non-realization of agen- 
cy, syntax and vocabulary to construct and reinforce a 'neutralizing language' which 
serves to facilitate the legitimization of certain militarization processes. One question 
which then arises concerns the applicability of such a construct for analyzing the Soviet 
equivalent of nukespeak. Certainly this type of research would provide a fascinating 
point of comparison, as well as underscoring the complexity of what is often a rela- 
tional series of utterances vis-a-vis the 'enemy'. An extensive search of the literature, 
however, has yet to produce a systematic study of this nature (see Keen, 1986, for an 
examination of visual metaphors and the mechanism of enmity in Soviet propagan- 
da); its import for future research must therefore be accentuated. 
For Chilton, who has been recognized as the originator of the term itself (see Beed- 
ham, 1983; Fawcett, 1985), to employ the notion of nukespeak is essentially to make 
three claims. First, that there is currently in use a specialized vocabulary for speak- 
ing about nuclear issues which relies on habitual metaphors and preferred grammati- 
cal construction; second, that this variety of English is 'ideologically loaded' to the 
extent that it works to justify 'nuclear culture'; lastly, that this is of importance to the 
extent that language affects how people think and therefore act on related issues (Chil- 
ton, 1982: 95). Hook makes an important addition in terms of the notion of perspec- 
tive. He suggests that the term nukespeak implies a fundamental choice between a 
view of nuclear 'reality' from the 'top down'; that is, from the 'official' definition, or 
'bottom up', which signifies the 'victims' position (Hook. 1985: 67). Further, Hook 
contends that "the perspective of the victims has been consistently excluded from the 
hegemonic nuclear discourse ... [as they] ... are most commonly viewed from the 
perspective of the executioners" (1985: 67). Such a configuration allows for the con- 
sideration of the choice itself, precisely as it is reproduced through the social framing 
of the predominant ways of speaking nuclear issues, as an explicit manifestation of 
particular relations of domination and resistance. 
Characteristic of much of the work completed on this problem to date is the view 
of nukespeak functioning as a conscious attempt on the part of the nation-state to 
facilitate the continued production and deployment of nuclear weapons. Often the 
primary focal point for this type of analysis is that nukespeak is designed to ensure 
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that the nation-state's policy on defence and security issues is perceived by the public 
as constituting the only sensible, rational and correct approach. The terminology and 
grammatical constructions attributed to those individuals and institutions positioned 
within the dominant nuclear discourse are therefore defined as controlled responses 
directed at potential threats to the nation-state's legitimacy (for a general discussion 
of the 'maleness' of related scientific discourses, see Easlea, 1983). Some evidence 
for this line of inquiry is provided through studies of 'official' rhetoric (see Franck and 
Weisband, 1971; Glasgow University Media Group, 1985; Halverson, 1971; Hook, 
1984b; Kress, 1985; Lapp, 1956; Luostarinen, 1986; Moss, 1985a; Nash, 1980; 
Rapopart, 1980; Richardson, 1985; Smith, D., 1987; Wander, 1984; Weart, 1985). as 
they illustrate certain advantages for the nation-state in propagating national 'self- 
defence', as opposed to propagating war, to maintain its continuous 'arms race'. In 
this way a world poised on the brink of a 'nuclear exchange' is both necessary and 
desirable if 'global stability' is to be maintained. The declaration of a 'winnable' or 
'limited' 'conflict' becomes euphemized as 'pushing the button', 'pulling the nuclear 
trigger' or making 'the ultimate decision'. Moreover, only after 'thinking the 
unthinkable' can a 'general nuclear response' be 'set into motion' (where the 'three Rs 
of winning' are 'reload'. 're-constitution' and 'refire'). 'Their' cities and towns then 
become 'soft targets' to be 'removed' with 'clean', 'surgical strikes'. Precisely what 
size the 'nuclear footprint' will be when a 'target of opportunity' is 'neutralized', 
however, depends upon the 'success radius'. As a result, while expressly denying their 
intention to sustain the 'arms build up', the 'superpowers' simply demonstrate their 
'need to uphold their ability to wage war'. Clearly, the term 'defence' is central here, 
since as an ideonym for the term 'war' it would indeed appear to allow the nation- 
state's military activity to be made synonymous with a perceived right to defend it- 
self. 
The Rhetoric of Defence 
is committed to a permanent war with either Eastasia or Eurasia; since the early 1950s, 
such has also been the case between the United States and the Soviet Union. F a  
example, commencing in the early 1950s a series of fictitious 'gaps' have been 
exploited for the purposes of legitimizing various demands for increased budgetary 
allocations to the military sector. 
In returning, temporarily, to the society h e l l  envisioned in 1984, certain readily 
discernable similarities between the imaginary world of Oceania and the present 
practice of global politics emerge as interesting points for further discussion. Oceania 1 
In the case of the United States these include "bomber 'gaps' (1953-1957); mis- 
sile 'gaps' (1959-1962); antiballistic missile or 'ABM' 'gaps' (1963-1967); security 
'gaps' (1972-1973); civil defence 'gaps' (in the sixties, seventies and again currently); 
[and] spending 'gaps' (intensified by the Reagan administration...") (Knelman, 1985: 
70; see also Ewen, 1980; Luckham, 1984). Similarly, President Reagan's 'window of' 
vulnerability' would appear to signify an (underlying) rationale for the United States' 
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'military build-up', a strategy partially reified through a 'peace through strength' and 
'nuclear forces' as 'sheltering arm for freedom' logic. As many commentators have 
pointed out, President Reagan has often sought to posit this rationale within the terms 
of a Christian imaginary ("The Lord will give strength to his people; the Lord will 
bless His people with peace"). L i e  Orwell's Big Brother, the Reagan administration 
struggles to explain through its preferred rhetorical devices (including a lexicon of 
morality) why national 'security' is contingent upon a sustained 'arms race'. A (now 
infamous) statement attributed to former Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger, 
appears to declare that war is in fact peace: "The only war we want is the war-which- 
never-was. But the war-which-never-was is a war which was never fought because 
we were prepared to fight and win it" More subtle examples include describing the 
'North Atlantic Treaty Organization' or 'NATO' as the 'world's greatest peace 
movement', the 'Missile Experimental' or 'MX' as 'The Peacekeeper', the 'Strategic 
Defence Initiative' as 'Star Wars' or a 'peace shield'. 
In the novel 1984 it is the character Emanuel Goldstein, 'Enemy of the People' 
and author of the banned book The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectives, 
who argues that war "helps to preserve the typical mental atmosphere that a hierarchi- 
cal society needs ... the object of war is not to make or prevent conquests of territory, 
but to keep the structure of society intact" (Orwell, 1954: 173). The ruling elite of 
Oceania consciously work to extract a popular consensus by presupposing a common 
will dependent on the existence of a villain: namely, Goldstein, the target of the 'Two 
Minutes Hate'. For the Reagan administration in the mid-1980's. the Soviet Union is 
the target; it is an 'evil empire' and 'the focus of evil in the modem world'; its people 
are 'monsters'. 'squalid criminals' and 'enemies of the human race' (that this rhetoric 
'softened towards the end of President Reagan's tenure deserves further scrutiny). In 
his first press conference after the 1980 election victory, President Reagan is reported 
to have stated: "I wouldn't trust the Russians around the block. They must be laugh- 
ing at us because we continue to think of them as people" (Knelman, 1985: 30). Hence 
the appropriateness of Thompson's claim that "we can kill thousands because we have 
first learned to call them 'the enemy"' (Thompson, 1980: 51). Furthermore, he con- 
tends, it is within language itself that "wars commence. We kill each other in 
euphemisms and abstractions long before the fust missiles have been launched (1980: 
51). If nuclear warfare is 'unthinkable' for the citizenry of the Western countries, he 
suggests it is because it is much more difficult to conceptualize the possibility that 
such a war would be inflicted upon 'us', and not the 'enemy'. The human mind, he 
argues, is the 'ultimate doomsday weapon' due to this apparent willingness to think 
the enemy 'Other' to death (1980: 52). 
Connell(1982) elaborates on this notion through an assessment of the 'red scare' 
as a rhetorical device, pointing out that if used as a premise the construct "removes the 
initiative from 'us', and places it squarely on 'them'. 'They' are positioned as the ag- 
gressors, 'we' merely respond to their clearly hostile initiatives in an attempt to deter" 
(Connell, 1982: 24-25). Communism, he maintains, has been constituted as a 'folk 
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devil'; that is, as a useful threat requiring continuous service to retain popular 
credibility (1982: 25). Connell cites the role played by various cultural fonns, includ- 
ing 'anti-communist' films and 'spy' novels, arguing that they function to mobilize the 
'red scare' theme and thereby make a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union a p  
pear to be inevitable 91982: 25). Similarly, several critical studies have been under- 
taken of the persuasive methods exploited by President Reagan in his official speeches 
and pronouncements ( See Knelman, 1985; Luostarinen, 1986; Moss, 1985a; Nelson, 
1987; Smith, D., 1987; Smith, J. 1987). Using evidence gathered from a textual 
analysis of various 'popular texts', including a speech made by President Reagan on 
arms negotiations, Moss argues that particular myths are consciously employed to 
structure public ways of thinking in the interest of ideological consensus (Moss, 1985a: 
4545,62) Fwther, his findings suggest that 'defence' rhetoric is underpinned emo- 
tionally and philosophically by abstractions such as duty, honour and obligation, and 
that these general cultural smctures are becoming synonymous with the 'military cast 
of mind' (1985a: 62). Consequently, generalized common-sensical constructions are 
partly controlled by the language of 'military culture' (1985a: 62). One attempt to il- 
lustrate the component structure of President Reagan's discourse is that of Luostarinin 
(1986) who argues that at least four distinct levels of abstraction are discernable. They 
are identified as: fnst, the level of myth: Harmony and God-Anarchy and Stan; 
second, the level of group identification: Liberty and the USA-Repression and the 
Soviet Union; third, the level of politics: Fight against communism-Alliance between 
crime, communism and terrorism; and fourth, the level of day to day politics: Peace 
initiatives-Military build-up (Luostarinen, 1986: 5). Thus to decode President 
Reagan's messages is to continuously move up and down what Luostarinen calls the 
'abstraction ladder', the end result being that an illusion of a controllable world is 
created through the use of enemy imagery as a political tool to increase integration 
and decrease social tension and confrontation (1986: 11-17). 
Dismantling Deterrence 
In the Western world,each 'new'development in nuclear policy ispremisedupon some 
reference to 'Soviet expansionism' or 'the Soviet threat' (see Connell, 1982; Ewen, 
1980; Kaldor, 1982; Knelman, 1985; Luckham, 1984; see also Halverson, 1971; 
Walker, 1987). Consequently, Beedham argues, "the nuclear arms debate is 
prejudiced, linguistically and conceptually, towards the government's view by the very 
language in which official channels present it" (Beedham, 1983: 15-16). In the process 
of examining the political inflections of certain semantic structures associated with 
'national self-defence' and the 'threat from outside', particularly as they are dispersed 
in 'official' discourse, the word 'deterrence' emerges as a primary focus of analysis 
(see Chilton, 1985b Kress, 1985; Marullo, 1985; Pasquinelli, 1985; Pietila, et al, 1983; 
Van Belle and Claes, 1985; Vigor, 1975; Wander, 1984). The two meanings associated 
with the English language verb 'deter' - 'inspiring fear' and 'holding back an 
aggressor' - lack a direct equivalent in the Russian language. According to Vigor, 
therefore, "the Russian mind is singularly illquipped to apprehend the notion of 'the 
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act of deterring' and not much better to apprehend that of the 'thing that deters'" (Vigor, 
1975: 476). This Russian 'failure' to fully conceptualize the Western notion of the 
'detemnt value'of nuclear weapons has, in his view, severely limited the potential for 
a 'truly meaningful debate' with the Western states (1975: 477). 
In sharp contrast to Vigor's position are the views of Chilton who considers this 
type of linguistic reasoning to be both absurd and dangerous, arguing that it rests on 
two fundamental misconceptions: first, the notion that the absence of a lexical item 
in a language implies an inability to comprehend the corresponding concept; and the 
second, the notion that the concept of deterrence is an objectively given category to 
be independently named in several languages (Chilton, 1985b: 103-04). Chilton as- 
sumes an alternative stance by insisting that conceptual limitation can not be inferred, 
particularly given that different cultures have formed in their military strategy various 
stable concepts and lexical items; examples include the Russian 'otpugivat' ('to 
frighten off'), the German 'abschrecken' ('ffighten off') and the French 'dissuader' 
('dissuade') (1985b: 104). To further substantiate this claim, Chilton moves to ques- 
tion the role of language in conceptualizing the domain of strategy. Findings from a 
rigorous linguistic analysis of the 'ideologically conditioned knowledge' which 
'deter', 'deterrent' and 'deterrence' signify suggests that, despite common claims to 
the contrary, nuclear weapons do not imply 'deter', but rather 'use' (1985b: 127). One 
brief example from his study is a quotation attributed to British Prime Minister 
Thatcher suggesting that 'deterrence has deterred'. Chilton points out that as it is pos- 
sible to state both that 'the (nuclear) deterrent deters the Russians' and that 'the 
(nuclear) deterrent does not deter the Russians* (a prerequisite for continuing nuclear 
armament production), a precise distinction between semantic and pragmatic factors 
can not be made; that is, the notion of deterrence is ideologically determined in specific 
ways by the user (1985b: 125-127). 
Further attempts to dismantle the 'theory of deterrence' as an ideological construct 
include the work of Van Belle and Claes (1985) who offer an examination of 'NATO' 
defence policy where 'words play as big a part as arms'. The 'official doctrine of 
NATO policy' is based on 'mutual deterrence', the logic of which they contend rests 
on a confusion between "the most spiritual power-belief-with the most material 
powerdestruction by nuclear arms" (Van Belle and Claes, 1985: 99). By assuming 
a perspective on deterrence which defines it as a semiotic behavior, the authors are 
able to analyze the 'psycho-logic' of the notion: firstly, in terms of closed systems of 
inference; secondly, in terms of culturally entrenched stereotypes and stories, and; 
finally, in terms of 'psych+pathological relations' between persons (1985: 95-101). 
NATO's 'deterrence discourse', they conclude, connotes that the 'enemy'or the 'other' 
is not seen as a 'real' other; rather it is always compared with an 'ideal image' of self 
(e.g. 'democracy' or 'freedom'), thus the dominant notion of deterrence is itself based 
upon a 'fundamental mistrust' (1985: 101). If the 'spiral of armament* is to be stopped, 
this mistrust must be eliminated through the development of an international dialogue 
: that has as its subject the politics of deterrence itself (1985: 101). 
28 Talking our Extinction to DeatWS. Allan 
Kress (1985) offers a complementary approach to the 'politics of deterrence' for- 
mulation by placing a new emphasis on the capacity of language to function as a form 
of 'social action'. Abasic anti-Soviet attitude, he contends, is present in all pro-nuclear 
deterrent texts (or constructed by its absence). Therefore, to devise strategies to alter 
the present ideological determinations of these texts, the social determination of lin- 
guistic practice must be theorized without precluding individual differences vis-a-vis 
the reader's role (Kress, 1985: 66-67,81-84). Strictly defined efforts to explicate lin- 
guistic action can not, he insists, account for how such arguments are embedded in 
those discourses which constitute the social life of most individuals, including discour- 
ses of work, the family, morality, nationalism, sexism and patriarchy (1985: 84). 
Kress's conclusion is thus similar to that of Van Belle and Claes to the extent that the 
very basis of the motivating ideology of pro-nuclear texts must be analytically 
privileged if the long-term ideological-political realignments articulated through 
strategic texts are to be brought about (1985: 84-86). 
It is clear that the degree to which the word 'deterrent' has been transformed into 
a synonym for nuclear weapons delimits the terrain for alternative efforts to (re)articu- 
late the need for eliminating their production. Moreover, this 'security rationale' and 
its privileged claim on 'reality' even appears to further mystify oppositional ways of 
formulating counter-definitions of what is 'at issue', thereby posing a significant dif- 
ficulty for any organized political intervention. This partial review of the literature 
would suggest that the deterrence construct appears to act as a dominant principle of 
pro-nuclear arguments, and when it is transferred to the deterrent 'value' of nuclear 
missiles (that is, the assumed value in the implicit claim that these weapons are actual- 
ly 'working' to deter the Soviet Union from aggressive action), then the concept itself 
is reified in relation to the missile's explosive capacity. If calls for disarmament are 
met with calls not for rearmament but for deterrence (Beedham, 1983: 22), and if 
'deterrence strategy' is based on 'preserving the balance of MAD (mutual assured 
destruction)', then the continuation of the race to build evermore powerful weapons 
will have been effectively secured by the nation-state. 
Discourses of Dissent 
The principal theme drawn from the literature on nukespeak and dissent is that nuclear 
discourse works to structure the dominant ways of speaking nuclear reality. As several 
of the above theorists have attempted to demonstrate, the primary organizing element 
structured into this hegemonic discourse is the unequal distribution of power to 
communicate. The struggle over access to the means of mass communication 
notwithstanding, to gain the 'credibility' required to be appropriated by the news media 
the counter-hegemonic discourse often adapts itself to the constraints of nuclear 
discourse. However, the extent to which the constant threat of marginalization, of 
being found guilty of 'bias' or 'emotionalism', forces speakers so posited to articulate 
their stance in such a way that the news media ascribe to its 'newsworthy' status is a 
continuing question. Moreover, the degree to which proponents of nuclear 
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disarmament will cater to the dictates of the dominant discourse, defining themselves 
in terms of the institutionalized notions of respectability and prestige necessary to be 
considered a voice deserving inclusion in public 'debate', has also been left largely 
unexplored. 
Richardson (1985) attempts to address this relationship through a textual analysis 
of, firstly, arguments employed by the British govemment against opponents of 
nuclear weapons (during February to May 1983) and, secondly, speeches made by 
British Prime Minister Thatcher and two defence ministers. Through considering the 
political speech as a discourse genre, different levels of meaning in the language used 
by Conservative ministers are differentiated to determine the 'official attitude' towards 
the 'anti-nuclear lobby'. Richardson examines various elements of Thatcher's dis- 
course, arguing that each has "different rhetorical pay-offs depending upon the inferen- 
tial frameworks deployed in specific subsections of the audience" (Richardson, 1985: 
39). Thus while Thatcher's rhetoric is not reproduced 'uncritically' by the intended 
audience, there exists a common thematic element which formulates 'defence 
dissenters' as 'the other' and consequently as an irrational and morally suspect force 
to be condemned (1985: 4 2 4 ) .  Similarly, Kress (1985) looks to formulate a linkage 
between multiple 'official' discourses as they conjoin and conflict in texts of opposi- 
tional 'genres'. A Campaign for Defence and Multilateral Disarmament pamphlet; a 
Socialist Workers Party handbill; a diocesan news-letter; a rally speech by a peace 
movement 'leader'; and a peace group news letter, are included in Kress's research 
sample. Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from his analysis is that 
the primary characteristic of these texts is their constitution around a cold-war repre- 
sentation of the Soviet Union (or, again, structured by its absence) which, in turn, acts 
as the motivating ideology for discourses within the nuclear issue field (1985: 85-86). 
Only through the study of generic forms, Kress contends, may one theorize the means 
by which the pmnuclear establishment has institutionalized control of or access to a 
whole range of genres currently 'closed off' to anti-nuclear groups (1985: 82). 
Fowler and Marshall (1985) examine various press and government texts to 
'bring to the surface' the systems of belief and perception most favorable to the direct 
actions of British govemment (paradigms). They argue that the language used con- 
stitutes a 'diffuse ideological assault' against any development within the culture that 
threatened the dominant paradigms (Fowler and Marshall, 1985: 21). For example, 
news reports of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) attempts to render 
problematic the 'ethics' of an arms race are implicitly structured in such a way as to 
define the group as a threat to the very basis of the rationalized defence posture. While 
concluding that what is at 'stake' in the larger ideological conflict is the dominant sys- 
tem of officially sanctioned assumptions about public attitudes and actions, their 
analysis offers only tentative evidence to support such a claim, and leaves untheorized 
the role played by either language or ideology. Perhaps the most comprehensive ex- 
amination of CND coverage is the case study undertaken by the University of 
Birmingham's CCCS Media Group (1983). This project, commissioned by the CND 
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itself, identifies the primary thematics of the debate through which the public discourse 
on disarmament is structured. Having rejected the notion of 'media bias', the group 
locates several 'traps' as they are inflected in the coverage. Examples include: the 
Defencepeterrence trap ('NATO is the best peace movement'); the Red trap 
(demonstrations are organized by communists); the class trap (CND is not repre- 
sentative of working class people); the gender trap (CND is connotatively 'feminine'); 
the youth trap (CND's members are young, naive and deviant); and the race trap (CND 
is Eurocentric). The discursive practices through which the news media work to con- 
struct an account of the various demonstrations appear to simultaneously ensure that 
the group's marginalization from 'mainstream' avenues of protest will be effectively 
reinforced. Only by transforming such 'traps' into 'openings', the researchers argue, 
will CND realize a new basis for its struggle for a counter-hegemony. 
Minutes To Midnight 
Work on nuclear discourse is explicitly political: efforts to facilitate the articulation 
of alternative knowledges pose a direct threat to the current reproduction of mass 
acquiescence to the 'nuclear phenomenon'. As detailed above, to disrupt the processes 
through which nuclear discourse places people (as historical subjects) within modes 
of identification working to secure preferred relations of inference, new critical and 
emancipatory positions must first be located and then reinforced. For discourses of 
dissent to intervene against the prevailing structures of 'obvious', 'common-sensical' 
knowledges about the dominant nuclear reality (and the socially contingent nature of 
its phallocentric truth), they must succeed in transcending the boundaries established 
through discursive lines of demarcation (see Pecheux, 1982). This may be best 
achieved through a number of interrelated strategies, such as explicating the means by 
which these counter-hegemonic knowledges are denied ascendancy into 'official' 
knowledge, or, similarly, attempting to identify as a site of struggle the patriarchal 
assumptions on which such discourses have come to depend. Another would be to 
address the very multiplicity of the discourses at play in news text (as well as the 
conditions of their hierarchical legitimacy for 'newsworthiness') and the 'naturalness' 
of their alignment with the 'real'. Furthermore, the operational rules and codes of 
newsgathering as routinized work could be examined, including its attendant reliance 
on the 'official sources' and 'expert opinions' found within bureaucratic support 
systems, in relation to the sense-making practices of the newsworkers themselves. 
The conceptual tools of discourse analysis may also prove well suited to assist 
with the further exploration of how an antagonistic differentiation could be imposed 
within the larger, public dispersion of nuclear discourse. After all, the 'official' lexi- 
con made available for newsworkers to draw upon not only helps them to consmct a 
general framework of facticity within their respective news accounts, it may also struc- 
ture each account so as to reify a technical or scientific authority set above 'reasonable' 
opposition. Associations of order, efficiency and institutional control may then be ac- 
tualized within the produced text, at least to the extent that those determinate power 
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relations effected through narrative closure remain embedded within the realm of a 
'taken-for-grantedness' understood implicitly by both newsworker and newsconsumer 
alike. Accordingly, having first rendered the pertinent concepts inaccessible to the 
non-specialist, the 'inside' language bamer (necessary for reinforcing the materialized 
practices of 'official' ways of knowing) is then itself preserved. Given the potential 
implications for nuclear discourse, Thompson's (1980) concern with the form of 
'normality' so configured is particularly important. In his view, 'inside' language 
works to habituate the addressed individual to certain expectations, thus not only does 
it encourage resignation to the problem of nuclear war, it also beckons on the event 
(Thompson, 1980: 5 1). 
This paper has attempted to argue for the importance of formulating for investiga- 
tion a new object of analysis: the social reproduction of nuclear discourse as it traver- 
ses the strategic field of the news media. Practitioners of media studies are well placed 
to elaborate upon present theoretical efforts to counteract the nation-state's 'official' 
discourse by opening it up to the broader forms of critique and contestation through 
the re-definition of its primary elements. This practice of criticism may even, in turn, 
be correlated with socio-political involvement as institutions currently posited within 
counter hegemonic discourses (not necessarily limited to groups involved with the ad- 
vancement of specific peace and disarmament causes) hold vast potential for assis- 
tance in the realization of this critical agenda. Such an approach could severely limit 
the ease with which nation-states articulate the relatively stable stereo-types and nar- 
rative syntagms of the Cold War binarism (particularly its external 'Other'). Evident- 
ly, until this 'nuclear reality' is transformed, 'the Balance of Terror' will continue to 
preclude a clear appraisal of the nation-state's legitimate defence needs. This while 
the minute hand of the 'doomsday clock' ticks ever closer to 'midnight' and the prac- 
tices of discourse management become increasingly refined. 
Endnotes 
This article has been drawn from two chapters prepared as part of an MA research 
essay by the author (see References below). It has since been revised for presentation 
to both the Canadian Communication Association (1987 meetings) and the 
International Communication Association (1988 meetings). Many of the ideas 
advanced here have thus had the benefit of detailed criticism. Accordingly, in addition 
to the Editor and anonymous reviewers of this Journal, the author wishes to 
acknowledge his indebtedness to Professors Jody Berland, Christopher Dornan, 
Robert A. Hackett, Dennis Mumby, John Myles, Patricia Smart, William Straw, and 
to fellow graduate students Cynthia Carter and Les Teichroew. 
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